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We study how the optimal use of labor income tax progression depends on whether the wage 
bargaining system is decentralized or centralized. Assuming a nonlinear labor income tax and 
an unrestricted profit tax, we show that a Utilitarian government is able to implement the first 
best resource allocation with a zero marginal labor income tax rate under decentralized wage 
bargaining, whereas centralized bargaining typically implies a progressive tax as well as 
unemployment. However, if the government and a (central) wage-setter bargain over wage 
formation and public policy, the resulting equilibrium is characterized by full employment 
and a zero marginal tax rate. 
 
JEL classification: H21, H23, J51, J52 








* The authors would like to thank the Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Foundation, the Swedish Council for 




It is well known that the effects of progressive labor income taxation in an economy with 
wage bargaining between trade unions and firms may differ fundamentally from those that 
would follow if the labor market is competitive. In a competitive labor market, increased tax 
progression typically increases the before-tax wage rate (through a reduction in the labor 
supply), whereas a trade-unionized labor market with involuntary unemployment may imply 
almost the opposite result: increased tax progression tends to push down the before-tax wage 
and, therefore, increase the number of employed persons along the labor demand function.
1 
Yet, the degree of tax progression - measured as the difference between (or ratio of) the 
marginal and average labor income tax rates
 - that will follow from optimal nonlinear income 
taxation in a trade-unionized economy has received much less attention (see below).
2 To our 
knowledge, there are no earlier studies comparing centralized and decentralized wage 
bargaining from the point of view of optimal tax progression, i.e. how the optimal use of 
progression may vary depending on whether wage bargaining is centralized or decentralized. 
This is somewhat surprising considering that the structure of wage bargaining is important for 
wage and employment outcomes and, therefore, also for the economy has a whole.
3 The 
purpose of the present paper is to fill this gap, by comparing the optimal tax policy under 
decentralized wage bargaining with the optimal policy that would follow with centralized 
wage bargaining. 
 
Although there are many earlier studies on optimal taxation or tax reforms in economies with 
trade union wage formation,
4 only a few of them have considered optimal nonlinear taxation 
in a general equilibrium framework. Fuest and Huber (1997) analyze the optimal tax policy of 
a Utilitarian government in an economy where the wage rate is decided upon in a 
(decentralized) wage bargain between the trade union and the firm, and the labor supply per 
                                                        
1 There is a large body of empirical evidence showing that higher tax progression moderates wage claims; e.g., 
Layard (1982), Hersoug (1984), Malcolmson and Sartor (1987), Lockwood and Manning (1993), Holmlund and 
Kolm (1995), Tyrväinen (1995), Koskela and Vilmunen (1996) and Aronsson et al. (1997). Other studies show 
more complex relationships between tax progression and wages; for instance, by using Danish data, Lockwood 
et al. (2000) find evidence suggesting that the effects of higher tax progression on the before-tax wage rate is 
income dependent. Such a result is also to be expected, if the influence that trade unions have varies between 
different segments of the labor market. See also Brunello et al. (2002) for empirical evidence rejecting the 
prediction of the wage bargaining model. 
2 A progressive tax is often defined such that the marginal tax rate exceeds the average tax rate; see, e.g., 
Musgrave and Musgrave (1984). 
3 There is a large literature that relates wage and employment outcomes to whether the wage bargaining system 
is decentralized or centralized; see, e.g., Calmfors and Drifill (1988) and Layard et al. (1991). 
4 See, e.g., Palokangas (1987), Boeters and Schneider (1999), Sörensen (1999) and Koskela and Schöb (2002).   3
employee is fixed. They show that if the government has access to an unrestricted profit tax in 
addition to the labor income tax, it may implement the first best resource allocation with full 
employment, and the optimal tax mix implies a progressive labor income tax. With restricted 
profit taxation, on the other hand, the optimal labor income tax may be either progressive or 
regressive. Aronsson and Sjögren (2004a) instead assume that the labor supply per employee 
is endogenous, and that the wage rate is decided upon by a firm-specific monopoly trade 
union. Contrary to Fuest and Huber, their results show that the optimal mix of (unrestricted) 
profit taxation and nonlinear labor income taxation (i) leads to a first best resource allocation 
with full employment, and (ii) features a zero marginal labor income tax rate. By imposing a 
binding restriction on the profit tax, their result changes dramatically: the economy is, in this 




The present paper differs from the aforementioned studies in that we relate the use of labor 
tax progression to whether the wage bargaining system is centralized or decentralized, instead 
of to whether restrictions prevent the government from using profit taxes in the most 
beneficial way. We consider an economy with a full set of tax instruments in the sense that 
the government has access to an unrestricted profit tax in addition to the nonlinear labor 
income tax. This constitutes a reasonably realistic description of the tax instruments that many 
governments have at their disposal. Furthermore, a general labor income tax in combination 
with unrestricted profit taxation means that labor tax progression (if such a tax structure is 
used at all) is the outcome of an optimal choice by the government subject to the distortions 
created by the wage bargaining system; it is not due to any arbitrary restriction on the 
possibility to redistribute between workers and firms owners. Our study also contributes by 
presenting a more general framework for studying relationships between wages, labor supply 
and tax progression. Contrary to Fuest and Huber (1997), and in accordance with Aronsson 
and Sjögren (2004a), we assume that the hours of work per employee are endogenous, 
whereas we follow Fuest and Huber in assuming that the wage rate is decided upon in a right-
                                                        
5 Aronsson and Sjögren (2004b) extend the analysis to a multi-country framework, where each country is 
characterized by wage bargaining at the firm level, and where domestic firms may move the production abroad 
in case the wage bargain fails. They show that each domestic government tends to choose too little labor tax 
progression (i.e. the marginal tax rate is too low relative to the average tax rate). The reason is that each national 
government neglects that a lower domestic wage rate leads to a higher reservation profit faced by foreign firms 
which, in turn, contributes to a lower wage rate and increased employment abroad. As a consequence, 
coordinated increases in the degree of tax progression can be used to increase the overall welfare.   4
to-manage framework. The latter accords well with the wage formation systems in many 
European countries. 
 
Our distinction between decentralized and centralized wage bargaining refers to whether or 
not the government is first mover vis-à-vis the wage-setter. With decentralized wage 
bargaining, each trade union and (corresponding) firm is small relative to the economy as a 
whole and treats the public policy as exogenous, while the government will be assumed to 
recognize how its policy-choices influence the wage formation. This means that the 
government is Stackelberg leader and the wage-setter follower, which is the conventional 
order of decision-making in optimal tax models with trade-unionized labor markets. In 
practice, however, trade unions usually resist government intervention in wage formation, and 
if they are able to organize workers at a high level of aggregation, the government may no 
longer be able to commit to its tax policy, simply because the behavior of an economy-wide 
trade union might have a considerable effect on the government’s budget constraint.  We 
therefore argue that with centralized, economy-wide wage bargaining, the government is less 
likely to be able to act as first mover vis-à-vis the wage-setter. The wage-setter may even 
recognize – and take advantage of – how the outcome of the wage bargain influences the 
government’s budget constraint. Two possible scenarios are discussed here: one in which the 
government and wage-setter are Nash competitors, and the other where the wage-setter is first 
mover vis-à-vis the government in the sense of incorporating how the unemployment benefit 
responds to a change in the wage rate. The latter is related to the discussion of encompassing 
coalitions in Olson (1982): the argument is that sufficiently large interest groups may 
internalize the effects of their actions on the public budget constraint.
6 A natural extension of 
centralized bargaining is to consider a “corporative economy”, where the government and the 
labor market parties cooperate on wage formation and public policy. Therefore, we also 
analyze the implications of coordination in the sense that a central trade union and the 
government bargain over the wage rate as well as the tax and expenditure policy. 
 
The outline of the study is as follows. In Section 2, we describe the model, which 
distinguishes between three types of consumers: employed and unemployed workers, and 
firm-owners whose income consists of the net of tax profit. We also characterize wage 
formation as well as analyze the outcome of optimization among agents in the private sector, 
                                                        
6 See also Summers et al. (1993) for an interesting analysis of how the behavior of encompassing coalitions may 
reduce the excess burden of taxation.   5
while the basic structure of the government’s decision problem is described in Section 3. 
Section 4 characterizes the optimal tax structure under decentralized wage bargaining, and 
shows that the government can implement the first best resource allocation with a zero 
marginal labor income tax rate. The intuition is that the nonlinear labor income tax, in this 
case, constitutes a perfect instrument for influencing wage formation without distorting the 
labor supply behavior. A similar result was derived by Aronsson and Sjögren (2004a) in a 
simplified model with (firm-specific) monopoly trade unions, which means that we extend 
their result to the more general right-to-manage framework. We analyze optimal taxation 
under centralized, economy-wide wage bargaining in Section 5, and show that the optimal 
labor income tax is unambiguously progressive in the sense that the marginal income tax rate 
exceeds the average income tax rate, even if the government has access to an unrestricted 
profit tax for redistribution between workers and firm owners. Furthermore, this result holds 
irrespective of whether we assume that the government and wage-setter are Nash competitors 
or the wage-setter moves first. In Section 6, we consider a “corporative” economy in which 
the wage rate and public policy are determined simultaneously through a bargain between the 
government and the wage-setter. If the government and wage-setter are able to reach an 
agreement, the results show that the equilibrium will imply a zero marginal income tax rate 
and full employment. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. The Model and Behavior of the Private Sector 
 
Consumers 
The economy comprises three consumer-types: employed workers, unemployed workers and 
firm owners. The consumers have identical preferences represented by the utility function 
() z c u , , where c is consumption and  z  leisure, and where leisure is defined by a time 
endowment,  H , less the hours of work, l. To be able to distinguish between the three 
consumer-types, we use  ) (⋅
e u , ) (⋅
u u and ) (⋅
o u  to denote the utility of an employed worker, an 
unemployed worker and a firm-owner, respectively, despite that these three functions 
represent the same underlying preferences. There are N employed and M-N unemployed 
workers, where M denotes the total work force. 
   6
The budget constraint faced by an employed worker is given by c
e = wl −Tw l () , where w is 
the hourly wage rate and Tw l ()  the tax payment. The decision-problem facing an employed 
worker can then be written as 
max ( ( ), )
e
l uw lT w lHl −−  
and the first order condition for work hours becomes 
  
uc
e 1− ′ T (wl) () w−uz
e = 0                         (1) 
 
where subindices denote partial derivatives, i.e.  /
ee e
c uu c = ∂∂  and  /
ee
z uu z =∂ ∂ , while 
() () / () Tw l d T w l d w l ′ =  is the marginal labor income tax rate. For further use, note also that 
we can write the labor supply elasticity with respect to the before-tax wage rate, κ , as 
follows: 
 






ee e e e ee e
zc z z c c c zc c
ee e e e e e e
zz cc z c cz z c c
ulu uu uu u u lw












cc uu c =∂ ∂ , 
22 /
ee
zz uu z =∂ ∂  and 
2 /
ee e
cz uu c z = ∂∂ ∂ . In equation (2), we have 
used  [1 '( )] /
ee
zc wT w l u u −=  from the first order condition presented in equation (1), as well as 
the short notation 
22 2 2 ' ' () () / () wT w l wdT w l dw l ζ ==  to capture the second order derivative 
of the labor income tax function. Note that equation (2) implicitly defines the labor supply 
elasticity with respect to the before-tax wage rate as a function of 
e c ,  l and ζ , i.e. 
(, ,)
e cl κκ ζ = . This insight, which follows by observing that 
e
c u , 
e
z u , 
e
cc u , 
e
zz u  and 
e
cz u  are all 
functions of 
e c  and l, will be used below in the study of optimal taxation and public 
expenditure. We assume that the second order condition is satisfied, which implies that the 
denominator of equation (2) is negative. 
 
Each unemployed worker receives a tax-free benefit, b, and faces the utility  () ,
uu uu b H = . 
Finally, firm-owners consume the after-tax profit and do not work, meaning that the utility 
facing each such firm-owner can be expressed as  ( ) ,
oo o uu c H = , where  () 1
o cs =−Π  is   7
consumption,  Π profit-income (see below) and s the profit tax. Since the number of such 
firm-owners is not important, it will be normalized to one. 
 
Firms 
The production sector is characterized by identical competitive firms producing a 
homogenous good, and we normalize the number of such firms to one for notational 
convenience. Let L denote the total number of work hours used in production, measured as 
the hours of work per employee, l, times the number of employed persons, N, while 
() F Lw L Π= −  is the profit, whereF(L) is an increasing and strictly concave production 
function such that  ′ F (L) > 0  and  ′′ F (L) < 0. The price of output has been normalized to one. 
Maximizing profits with respect to L gives the labor demand, L = L(w). 
 
Trade Unions and Wage Formation 
Following earlier comparable literature (Fuest and Huber 1997, Aronsson and Sjögren 
2004a), each trade union is assumed to face a Utilitarian objective, and all workers are trade 
union members. By analogy to the treatment of the firms above, we normalize the number of 
trade unions to one. The objective function faced by the trade union is written as 
 
U = N u
e wl −T(wl),H −l ( )+ M − N ( ) u
u b,H ( ).                    (3) 
 
We assume that the trade union recognizes that the employed members choose work hours 
according to equation (1) above. To begin with, we also assume that the trade union treats the 
policy instruments, i.e. the functional form and parameters of  () T ⋅  and the unemployment 
benefit, b , as exogenous. We can then derive 
 
 







el ⎡ ⎣ ⎤ ⎦                       (4) 
 
where  () ' ()/() 0 wL w w L w ε =<  is the wage elasticity of labor demand and     κ = lww/ l  the 
wage elasticity of labor supply. To derive equation (4), we have used  (1 '( ))
ee
cz uw T w l u −=  
from equation (1). 
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The wage rate is determined in a bargain between the trade union and the firm. Assuming that 
the fallback utility facing the trade union is given by 
u Mu , i.e. the utility that would follow 
from equation (3) if all members become unemployed, the utility-rent following the bargain is 
given by  [ ]
ru e u UU M uN uu =− = − . Similarly, if the fall-back profit faced by the firm is 
zero, the Nash product underlying the bargain becomes 
 
 
1 [] [ ( 1) ]
r Us
α α − Ω= Π − .                        (5) 
 
The first order condition can then be written as 
 





αα Ω=↔ − − =
Π
                      (6) 
 
where  w U  is given by equation (4) above. We will return to the properties of equation (6) 
below. 
 
3. Objective and Budget Constraint of the Government 
 
We assume that the objective function of the government is given by a Utilitarian social 
welfare function 
 
() () ( ) ( ) ( )  ,  , 1 ,
ee u o WN u c H l MN u b Hu s H =− + − + − Π .                  (7) 
 
The government raises revenue through the labor income tax, NT(⋅), and the profit tax, sΠ, 
which finances the unemployment benefit, (M − N)b. Note also that  ) (⋅ T  is a general income 
tax, which can be used to implement any desired combination of 
e c  and l. Therefore, it will 
be more convenient to write the public decision-problem such that 
e c  and l are direct 
decision-variables, instead of controlling 
e c  and l indirectly via the parameters of the tax 
function.
7 By using  ( ) ( ) 0 NT wl s M N b +Π − − =  together with the private budget constraints, 
the government’s budget constraint can then be written as 
 
                                                        
7 This approach is standard in the literature on optimal nonlinear income taxation.   9
()0
e sb w l c N b M Π+ + − − = .                      (8) 
 
In addition to the budget constraint given by equation (8), the government also faces an 
employment constraint in the sense that the number of employed persons cannot exceed the 
work force, i.e. 
 
  0 MN −≥ .                          (9) 
 
4. Optimal Taxation and Decentralized Wage Bargaining 
 
Under decentralized wage-setting, each wage-setter (trade union and corresponding firm) is 
small relative to the economy as a whole. It is, therefore, natural to assume that wage-setters 
treat economy-wide policy variables as exogenous, and that the government is first mover in 
the sense of recognizing how its policy influences the wage rate. To see the implications of 
this decision-structure, note that the first order condition for the wage rate in equation (6) can 
be written as 
 
()
(, ) 1( )
() ( 1 )0




ucH l l L w
w
wu c H l u b Hw
αε κ α
⎡⎤ −
−+ − − = ⎢⎥ −− Π ⎣⎦
.                         (10) 
 
By solving equation (10) for w, we can derive the wage equation 
 
(, , ,)
e ww c l b κ = .                      (11) 
 
As explained above 
e c  and l are direct decision-variables in the optimal tax and expenditure 
problem. The labor supply elasticity with respect to the before-tax wage rate, κ , is also 
interpretable as a direct decision-variable: with 
e c  and l held constant, κ  is determined by 
the second order derivative of the labor income tax function according to equation (2). One 
can show that if  () 1   1 − < − > κ , then  ( ) /0  0 κζ ∂ ∂< > . To simplify the optimal tax and 
expenditure problem below, we assume that the relevant range for κ  is  ) , 1 ( ∞ − .
8 In this case, 
                                                        
8 This assumption accords well with empirical evidence on the labor supply; see Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) 
for a literature review.   10
and for a given combination of 
e c  and l, the government can perfectly control κ  via the 
second order derivative of the labor income tax function,  ''( ) Tw l . We will, therefore, treat κ  
as an additional decision-variable of the government. At the optimum, therefore, 
() / TT w lw l = , '( ) Tw l and  ''( ) Tw l  can be inferred from the choices of 
e c , l and κ . 
 
The Lagrangean corresponding to the social decision-problem can then be written as 
 
( ) () ( ) ( ) ( )
[]




Nu c H l M N u bH u s H
sb w l c N b M M N μγ
=− + − + Π −
+Π + +− − + −
                (12) 
 
in which μ  and γ  are Lagrange multipliers. Note first that by using  ()l w L N / = , the partial 
derivative of the Lagrangean with respect to the before-tax wage rate, with 
e c ,  l,  b  and s 





eu o w w
c
LL b
uu u L s L s T
wl w l l
με γ
∂⎛ ⎞ ⎛⎞ =− − − + − + + − ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ∂ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠
.                (13) 
 
With equation (13) at our disposal, and by using w = w(b,c
e,l,κ), the first order conditions 
can be written as 
 
££








=− − + =
∂∂ ∂



















uu N u w N T
ll w l l w l
μγ
∂∂ ∂ ⎛⎞ =− − − + − − + + = ⎜⎟ ∂∂ ∂ ⎝⎠



















                    (14e) 
 
together with the complementary slackness condition  ( ) /0 ML l γ − = . We can now derive 
the following result:   11
 
Proposition 1. If the government is first mover vis-à-vis the wage-setter, the optimal resource 
allocation is first best, and is characterized by (i) full employment and (ii) a zero marginal 
labor income tax rate,  '( ) 0 Tw l= . 
 
Proof: see the Appendix. 
 
The intuition behind Proposition 1 is straightforward: the government has a sufficient number 
of instruments to control all endogenous variables ( , , , , )
eu o cl w cc in the economy. To be more 
specific, the optimal choice of κ  means that equation (13) reduces to  read 
u
e − u
u + μ T + b () −γ = 0, implying  0 γ >  and  NM =  in equilibrium. The remaining first 
order conditions can be used to show that  '( ) 0 Tw l= . As such, the government may 
implement full employment by exercising control over the wage rate (through an appropriate 
choice of κ ) and implement the desired distribution between consumer-types (through 
appropriate choices of tax payments and unemployment income) without distorting the labor 
supply incentives. Aronsson and Sjögren (2004a) derived an analogous result in a model with 
(firm-specific) monopoly trade unions, whereas Proposition 1 differs from a corresponding 
result derived by Fuest and Huber (1997), who assume right-to-manage wage formation (as 
we do) while treating the hours of work per employee as fixed. Instead, they found that the 
optimal policy mix that leads to full employment includes a progressive labor income tax such 
that  '( ) 1 TT w l << . 
 
5. Optimal Taxation and Centralized Wage Bargaining 
In this section, we address centralized wage formation in the sense that an economy-wide 
trade union bargains with an employer association. As we indicated in the introduction, with 
centralized wage bargaining, it is not necessarily the case that the government has a first-
mover advantage when choosing the tax and expenditure policy. We begin by considering a 
scenario where the government and the wage-setter are Nash-competitors and move 
simultaneously. This means that the wage-setter treats the policy variables as exogenous (as 
before), and that the government treats the wage rate as exogenous. We will then briefly 
consider a decision-problem where the wage-setter moves first. In the next section, a   12
corporative economy will be examined, where the trade union and the government bargain 
over the wage rate and the policy variables. 
As before, the outcome of the wage bargain can be described by equation (6). The objective 
function of the government is represented by (7), while the budget and employment 
constraints are given by equation (8) and (9), respectively. Under centralized wage 
bargaining, the government treats the wage rate as fixed and will, therefore, not in general be 
able to implement full employment, which means that  0 γ = .
9 In this case, equation (14e) will 
become redundant. The first order conditions for b , 




































while the first order condition for s remains as in equation (14d). First, note that by 
combining equations (14d), (15b) and (15c), we have uc
e = uc
u = uc
o, meaning that the marginal 
utility of consumption is equalized among consumer-types. Using the first order condition for 
work hours given by (1) together with equation (15b) gives  ()
ee
zc wu T w u μ ′ −=⋅ . Substituting 








Tw l T w l
uw l w l
− ′ −= +  (16) 
 
where  () ( ) / ( ) Tw Tw l w l =  is the average labor income tax rate. As indicated above, a 
progressive tax system is typically defined such that the marginal tax rate exceeds the average 
tax rate, i.e.  ′ T ⋅ ()−T > 0. Note that this applies to equation (16) since, first, the “replacement 
ratio”  bw l  is positive, and, second,  0
eu uu − > . This latter follows from the first order 
                                                        
9  The argument that the optimal tax policy does not implement full employment is not dependent on the 
assumption that the government treats the wage rate as fixed. It will always apply unless the government can 
perfectly control the wage rate via policy.   13
condition for wage determination by noticing that u
e −u
u ≤ 0 would imply that this condition 
no longer holds (at least for     κ > ε(w)). A Nash-equilibrium is a wage rate, average and 
marginal labor income tax rates, unemployment benefit, and profit tax such that equations (6), 
(14d), (15a), (15b), (15c) and the government’s budget constraint are fulfilled simultaneously. 
The second result is portrayed below: 
 
Proposition 2. If the government treats the hourly wage rate as exogenous when determining 
the optimal tax and expenditure policy, the resulting labor income tax will be progressive, 
and the Nash-equilibrium is characterised by less than full employment. 
 
Since the government is unable to reach full employment through policies designed to 
influence wage formation, it will implement a “work sharing” arrangement: by reducing the 
hours of work per employee through a progressive labor income tax, the number of employed 
persons increases. Equation (16) shows that the greater the utility difference between 
employment and unemployment, or the larger the benefit paid out to each unemployed, the 
more progressive will be the labor income tax (measured by the difference between the 
marginal and average rate). The intuition is, of course, that any of these components 
contributes to increase the cost of unemployment (either through lost utility or lost public 
revenue). 
 
To go further and characterize the relationship between unemployment and taxation in terms 
of observable variables under centralized wage-setting, let us consider the special case where 
the wage rate is decided upon by an economy-wide monopoly trade union. The first order 
condition for wage formation then reduces to read Uw = 0 , where Uw is defined by equation 
(4). By using  [1 '( )]
ee
zc uu wT w l =−  from equation (1) and substituting into equation (4), the 
first order condition for the wage rate becomes 
 
  ε(w)−κ () u
e − u
u ( )+ uc
e 1− ′ T (⋅) ( )wl = 0. (17) 
 
Solving equation (17) for  u
e − u
u () uc
e wl  and substituting the resulting expressions into 
equation (16), one obtains 
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⎦ ⎥ (18) 
 
where we have used the government’s budget constraint to eliminate b . In equation (18), the 
marginal labor income tax rate is expressed in terms of measurable quantities, where 
UR = (M − N)/M  is the unemployment rate. Defining S = sπ Mwl  as the average profit tax 
to work income, and solving equation (18) for the unemployment rate, we have 
 
UR =
κ −ε(w) () T + S ⎡ ⎣ ⎤ ⎦
1−ε(w)+κ () ′ T (⋅)−1
. (19) 
 
Equation (19) has a simple interpretation. The term within square brackets in the numerator 
represents “average taxation”. It is the sum of the average labor income tax rate and the 
average profit tax to worker income. In the Nash-equilibrium, the unemployment rate is 
proportional to average taxation and inversely related to the marginal labor income tax rate. 
Note also that, for given parameters of the tax system, numerically larger demand and supply 
elasticities tend to be associated with a lower unemployment rate as larger elasticities tend to 
increase the union’s cost of a wage increase. 
 
Trade Union Leadership 
 
If we continue to assume that the government takes the wage rate as given when determining 
the optimal tax system, a natural question to ask is what incentives the centralized trade union 
may have to exploit how the government responds to a change in the wage rate. The idea is 
that the trade union knows that the government sets taxes and the unemployment benefit so 
that the marginal utility of consumption is equalized between employed and unemployed 
workers. Using equations (15a) and (15b), we have uc
e wl −T(wl),H −l ( )= uc
u b,H () . 






e 1− ′ T (⋅) () l + wlw () − ucz
e lw
ucc
u . (20) 
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A sufficient condition for db dw to be positive is that  0
e
zc w ul≥ , which would follow if  0 w l ≥  
and  0
e
cz u ≥ . Let b = b(w) denote the relationship between b  and w implied by the condition 
that 
eu
cc uu = . Strategic leadership by the trade union then implies that the wage bargain is 
carried out under the additional constraint b = b(w). The first order for the wage rate in 











Ω+ =.     (21) 
 
By comparison, equation (21) contains an additional term, which is positive if  0 w b > . The 
trade union would then benefit from increasing the wage rate beyond that of the Nash 
equilibrium. The following result applies: 
 
Proposition 3. If the wage-setter is acting Stackelberg leader vis-à-vis the government, and if 
0 w l ≥  and  0
e
cz u ≥ , the wage rate is higher and the level of employment lower than under 
Nash-competition. 
 
Note that equation (16) still applies, which means that the labor income tax is progressive also 
when the wage-setter acts as first mover. However, it is not possible, in general, to show 
whether tax progressivity (as measured by the difference  '( ) TT ⋅ − )  is higher or lower under 
trade union leadership than under Nash-competition. 
 
6. A Corporative Approach to Taxation, Public Expenditure and Wage Formation 
 
In this section, we consider a corporative economy, in which the government and a trade 
union cooperate in determining the wage rate, tax policy and public expenditure. Here, the 
labor market will be described in terms of a monopoly trade union, whose objective, U , is 
given by equation (3). The monopoly union assumption simplifies the analysis and appears to 
us to be reasonable in this case: a trade union strong enough to bargain with the government 
over public policy is most likely also a dominant actor in the labor market. The objective 
function faced by the government, W , is given by equation (7). 
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If the bargain fails, we assume that the resource allocation is governed by the centralized 
wage formation model described in the previous section, which gives the optimal tax structure 
as presented in Proposition 2. Let 
c U  and 
c W  be the utility faced by the trade union and the 
government, respectively, if the bargain fails, i.e. the fallback utilities of relevance in the 
simultaneous cooperation on public policy and wage formation. These reservation utilities are 
predetermined and, therefore, treated as fixed. We can then write the Nash-product governing 




ϕ ϕ − Λ= %%                        (22) 
 
where 
c WWW =− %  and 
c UUU =− %  are the utility-rents from the bargain, and ϕ  the 
bargaining power of the government. 
 
By analogy to the analyses carried out above, the decision-problem set out here is described 
such as to choose w, b , 
e c , l and s to maximize the Nash-product given by equation (22) 
subject to the labor demand, L = L(w), the government’s budget constraint in equation (8) 
and the employment constraint in equation (9). The Lagrangean corresponding to this 
decision-problem will be written as 
 
  [ ] £l n( 1 ) l n [ ( ) ]
e WU s b w l c N b M M N ϕϕ μ γ =+ −+ Π + + − − + − %% .               (23) 
 
The full set of first order conditions are presented in the Appendix. By using these conditions, 
one can immediately notice that the social marginal utility of consumption is equalized among 
consumer-types in equilibrium in the sense that 
 
(1 ) (1 ) eu o




−− ⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ += += = ⎢⎥ ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ %% %% % , 
and that the first order condition for the wage rate can be rewritten to read 
  () ()
(1 )
0




− ⎡⎤ +− + + − = ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦ %% . 
Therefore, 0 γ >  and  NM =  in equilibrium. The first order condition for l then implies 
ee
cz uw u = . We have derived the following result: 
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Proposition 4. In a corporative economy, where the government and economy-wide trade 
union bargain over public policy and the wage rate, the optimal resource allocation is 
characterized by (i) full employment and (ii) a zero marginal labor income tax rate, 
'( ) 0 Tw l= . 
   
Note that the resource allocation in the corporative economy is not the same as under 
decentralized wage bargaining: since the objectives underlying policy differ between these 
two allocations, the distribution of resources between the consumer-types will also differ. 
Both resource allocations will, nevertheless, be characterized by full employment and a zero 
marginal labor income tax rate. The intuition is that the socially optimal wage rate equalizes 
the aggregate supply and demand in the labor market. With decentralized wage formation, as 
in Section 4, the government was able to reach full employment by using the second order 
derivative of its own income tax (which, in that case, constitutes a perfect instrument for 
influencing the wage rate); in the corporative economy analyzed here, the wage rate is, 
instead, a direct decision-variable in the economy-wide bargain. In either case, and with 
access to a general labor income tax and unrestricted profit taxation, the decision-maker can 
attain the desired redistribution on a lump-sum basis (by altering the average tax paid by the 
employed, the unemployment benefit and the profit tax) without distorting the labor supply 
behavior. 
 
7. Summary and Discussion 
 
This paper concerns optimal labor tax progression in imperfectly competitive labor markets 
where we make a difference between decentralized and centralized wage formation. Using a 
right-to-manage framework, we first show that, if wage formation is decentralized in the 
sense that a large number of firms and trade unions bargain over wages, the government can 
implement the first-best full employment outcome by using the curvature of the labor income 
tax function to control the wage rate. In that case, the marginal labor income tax rate will be 
zero at the optimum. Centralized wage formation is modelled by assuming that the 
government will not be able to act as a first-mover vis-à-vis the wage-setter. Here, we 
distinguish between two main cases: (i) the government and the labor market parties play a 
non-cooperative Nash-game (or Stackelberg game, in which the wage-setter is leader), and (ii) 
a corporative economy where the government and wage-setter engage in a cooperative 
bargain over wage formation and public policy. In the former case, we have unemployment   18
and progressive labor income taxation at the (second best) optimum; in the latter, the 
equilibrium is characterized by full employment and a zero marginal labor income tax rate. 
 
The two cases of centralized wage formation discussed in the paper represent polar positions. 
Direct bargaining between a trade union and the government may be seen as an extreme form 
of income policy, while in the noncooperative Nash-game the government does not try to 
influence the wage rate at all. In reality, governments do try to influence wage determination, 
often by talks, formal and informal agreements. Such arrangements may successfully lead to 
wage and price moderation. However, the results derived in the paper show that, unless the 
government can fully control wage formation directly or indirectly, the resulting equilibrium 




Proof of Proposition 1 
 
Equation (14e) implies  £/ 0 w ∂∂ =  (since  / w κ ∂ ∂  is generally nonzero), in which case the 
final term on the right hand side of equation (14a), (14b) and (14c), respectively, vanishes. 
Then, by using equations (14a), (14b) and (14d), we can derive 
euo
ccc uuu = = , in which case 




u () + μ T +b () −γ = 0.                   (A1) 
 
Now, since  u
e −u
u () > 0 and  () 0 > +b T μ  at the optimum, equation (A1) implies  0 > γ , so 
M N = . Then, by using equations (14b) and (A1) to substitute for μ  and γ , respectively, in 




z = / , implying  '( ) 0 Tw l= .g 
 
The First Order Conditions in the Corporative Model 
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